INDIGENOUS CULTURE & DEVELOPMENT

SPANDA

THE PERPLEXITY OF THE SEEN

The mind is a device to calculate the astronomy of matter.
Go through matter and become spirit.
After Rumi, ANONYMOUS, 22ND CENTURY.

"**W**ELCOME TO THE AGE of evidence!" innerly uttered the fool. "Ah, ah, ah!" A solid laugh at his back reminded him that his utterances were unreal and that, in any case, Sister *Maya* deserved more attention since her veil yet prevents looking through the *rideaux* of the absurd – *ab-surdus*, out of tune, *absurdum,* in its ablative case.

A sacred language conveys sacredness into its sound, into meanings and words and, by uttering them, it sacrifices them on the altar of vanity by disclosing its origin beyond the veil: "An absurdity! A total absurdity that nobody would ever believe!" Ok, here we are. Keep the thread.

In Sanskrit, the vowels are considered to be the seed *(bija),* the consonants the matrix *(yoni)* and, by their combination and interplay, language is formed. The common idiom for 'he dies' is 'he becomes five' *(pañcatvam gacchati),* i.e. 'he is resolved into the five elements', that is to say, ether, air, fire, water and earth, or, according to another tradition, into the five elemental souls *(nafs amarah, muhlamah, muthaminah* etc.*).* Inhale: in-spire for a while and then let it go: subtle realities ordinarily unapparent are surfacing

right in the suspension between the two actions – in deeds and in reality they are nothing but the two modalities of the Real, simultaneously the observer and the observed, depending on the point of view. But if the point of observation is located in neither of the two relaters – where relativity abides – but rather in between the two, they are perceived by the unified consciousness as one, as they are for real. The way we perceive the world comes about and is such because we live inside bodies and we tend to think in metaphors grounded in this embodiment, which, in turns, shapes how we relate to the world. The time of the observers is gone, lost and forgotten for ever, now is the time of an active contemplation of reality: no longer spirit and matter devoid of each other, but is their unity to lead the way – [the way that can be said, is not the way]: one point lower.

Active contemplation bears more climates than the previously seen. Between contemplation and insight dwells the abyss, *a-byssós* (end-less), be aware, Infinity is there, here is sacredness itself: still a distinction flashing the thinking mind resilient to disclose information beyond its reach. Our need to classify and divide into endless logical trees contravenes and defies unity. Consonant with the triggering of the inner self, form and content vibrate at the same frequency, in unison, like the name and the named they are

but one. When there is no diastema between the former and the latter, between knowledge, will and action, all deeds are aligned with the cosmic flux of the *dharma*; when instead a differential gap, a *yatus* between the two holds there, actions are initiated and carried out in a split-reality and, as such, are deemed to undergo a process of purification because they are deprived of knowledge. As with any individual human being, humankind as a whole also needs to purify its own *karma*, a path cluttered with violent deaths, wars and abuses, humiliations and unhappiness, where beauty, joy and harmony are rarely witnessed. Beware, at present, spirit is embodying matter and matter is devouring and

– brought into being by the original Be! *(kun)* – is wholly recovered into the being. But when does life spark into being? When is the *jiva* channelled to incarnate – or re-incarnate? For sure in a 'moment' devoid of time, in which the synergetic result of the coupling of the two converging energies determines the quality of its nature – and that of its physical body. It is the self-reflective human consciousness to inspire its way. Motion takes place in the natural world with the clear awareness of being a being. From above to below – to the inner; from the inner to the outer – to the world; from the world to above – to the next evolutionary spiralling coil of consciousness: a reflection, repeating itself each time

VISUAL ILLUSION

metabolizing spirit: whenever appropriate, an ecstatic vertigo may occur. Crisis and change. Transformation.

Nothing exists without movement, yet the ultimate movement does not occur in space or time, but inside the supreme consciousness *(cit)*. It is a cycle of expansion-externalization-manifestation and contraction-internalization-absorption within consciousness itself, relating to the most elevated plane in creation. What from one perspective is *contraction*, from the other is, simultaneously, *expansion*. In reality nothing expands or contracts, only the vibration appears in its different modalities as expanding or contracting, namely, it depicts its ondulatory nature through the mirror of *maya* to the sundered perception of the thinking mind. Every 'moment' is unique in its a-dimensional presence.

At last! a multidimensional reality is here! Not an ego-driven reality-show, but a reflection, a trope, repeating itself each time on a different level with a different meaning *(antanáklasis)*. "If my blood were shed by that friendly Face, dancing triumphantly I would lavish my life upon Him" is a longing for a 'moment' out of time because consciousness is 'temporarily' divided. Time is bound to its eternal spiral until the full extent of the individual soul *(jiva)*

anew *(antanáklasis)* with a different flavour *(rasa)*. In its trajectory of sustainable growth (expansion) the individual soul needs to experiment with duality in order to master, within the space-time dimension, all other human bearings as well. It is a necessary passage for this occasional traveller to move forth to its next phase and enrich it with its experimental evidence, with the knowledge acquired by repeated trials – expression and experience outspring from the same root *(ex-peritus)*. Of course this is merely a rough rendering of the process taking place in duality. In unity – since neither time nor space are welcome in it – the whole process occurs simultaneously, no diastema or interval could possibly be in between the two: just one, just be. The original self-motivated 'impulse' is cogent to the inborne action that occurs in infinity by breaking through the flushing of two instants of the historical linear time: there, exactly in that atemporal space-free peak delves and delivers Infinity: between the impossible spatial approaching of two into one – not even an irrational number can abide in the solid materiality of the linear time. No increase of power is needed to accomplish it. What is required instead is to decrease the resistances of the barriers *(nafs)* displaced by *time* in the course of their existence,

and assign them back to their original seats. As in nuclear fission, a fit in the nucleus of the innermost self will fire up the healing process of the inner and the outer self, of the psyche, the soul and the body. Verily, to progress further, the whole being needs to resonate to a higher pitch. Transmutation.

Back to mimesis: to show, rather than to tell, by an enacted action neither diegetic nor narrative. A mimetic action can enact the rite and re-present the Real by enacting the sensible world by means of insensible means in the historical becoming of linear time – a mimetic representation is a 'possible rendering' of reality, not Reality itself. Ritual

good was very suspiciously regarded and looked at with a distrustful glance. When instead individual and social capital are enacted devoid of self-interest, altruism is disentangled from the ego-drivers. "Money", the quintessence of matter at the human level, has obsessed societies for far too long. The new awareness is transmuting the ego to the service of a higher self. If it would be just a matter of spurring creativity, it wouldn't happen. Creativity is a result of love; relativity is the upshot of the space-time dimension, in a realm devoid of space-time a higher respect for life will abide. Humankind deserves a not-for-profit outlook throughout the chain of society, the next state of consciousness will

RITUAL

DARWISH
DANCING

secretness is necessary when the myth is originating to keep it on track throughout its flourishing, just as a caring maieutic tutor in the very minute process of growth of a tutee – above all when the channels granting access to the individual and collective pattern of energy gravitating at subtle level are in the tutee not yet cleared of the debris of their purification process – once the channels are fully cleared, the tutor is unnecessary. Once the seed *(bija)* has been planted into the matrix *(yoni)* and nourished and matured, finally comes the moment to disclose its content, to get rid of all mental formations, and be, just be and nothing else. Once the myth is ripe, all secrets are disclosed. A remark: at times, hardship on the way could assist growth, but it can never be an excuse for an increase of suffering. Right in between the sufferance as an instrument of growth of the Western heritage and the Eastern way to get rid of all sufferance tout-court detaching oneself from the world, lays the middle way of sufferance as a by-product of growth, a side effect of development: the responsible human way to unite heaven to earth, neither an esoteric nor an exoteric device, but the mesoteric way of the undivided reality devoid of self-interest.

Egoism, greed and profit are the expected outcomes of an ego gone-wrong, they all belong to an earlier evolutionary stage in which the common

bring a global non-profit society, a new development phase, a new economy – of which the 'green' one is just a pale foreteller. A global generalized transmutation of the individual consciousness to a collective plane, devoid of self-interest and to the benefit of the whole of society is the founding body of the new paradigm. A new state belonging to the real human soul able to welcome the other into oneself and be both, regardless of races and creeds, given that all of them are already deeply rooted within. The shift of the paradigm in the collective consciousness and the simultaneous systemic change taking place at the global, social and economic level are just the 'two' sides of the 'same' coin. Reconciliation.

Aiming at reconciliation is aiming to be reunited within our own dyad. Knowledge advances. In the last century or so many things have changed so greatly that even recent history seems to belong already to a remote past. A perception due to the seeming speeding up of the succession of events in the time dimension and to the heightening of the vibratory frequency approaching a higher state of consciousness – each definable state vibrates at its own specific lengthwave. The higher the octave the faster the wave, certainly faster than the physical light. This quickening of the frequency made some believe in the converging collapse of the whole system and of consciousness

itself, as if the maximum possible expansion was reaching its limit and, by enantiodromia, soon transmute into contraction, not mindful that, in duality, transmutation is only possible from one state to another and, in within the same state, from one condition to either a temporary or permanent state. It well may be that physics and meta-physics will shortly join hands in a proficient mesa-physics – mesocosm connects macrocosm to microcosm. Twenty-12 will certainly not mark the end of the world, but almost certainly score the end of 'a' world, and the implementation of a new paradigm on the account of the major shift taking place simultaneously on all planes of consciousness while rebounding in every conceivable dimensions its higher ethical edge. With the integration of will and deeds, knowledge and action become one and affects both individual and collective development, both spiritual and material poverty. The former setting maintained material poverty as a tool for inner development, keeping the sharp heel of indigence well stuck on the subdued societies in the mired suspicious notion that mundane detachment facilitates the achievement of a higher state of consciousness. We maintain that in the 'present time', ending the distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' and dwelling in both worlds, the implementation of the new collective state of consciousness beyond and before profit is necessary. While Krishna and Arjuna are one on the chariot, a parliament of birds will salute the outcome of riding the tiger on a razor edge. Duality is a mental formation of the mind-bearer, who does not, or wants not, or cannot yet experience a unified reality. The transition to unity is gradually taking place, the cracks and downturns of old regimes and of mental constructions, the financial crises, a vaster generalized greener outlook to the world, a higher awareness of the social edge of a post-ideological politics and democracy are all events occurring to a hastened tempo, signs and signals of something happening deeper within consciousness, cracking the surface of the individual ego to make way for the new, the other: an unexpected gift. Trying to keep together the debris falling asunder from this transition could be an instrumental exercise of change, for sure; but the direction should be held firm while keeping duality in check. The tricks of a mind not yet abraded anew and still to be purified of its previous content, and the stirring of emotions before their mollification are preventing this awareness from taking full swing. Our perception couples harmonic oscillations and enantiodromia: the probability varies periodically; all universes are just their probability to exist: multidimensional eigenstates chirals, not identical to their mirror image. Any emanating reverberation diminishes the substance, until they are just the last chance to be apparent, and finally be. Disquiet. A change in equilibrium, a quiver *(spanda)* … and the wheel is spinning anew. We are individualized spiritual energies, beings, individual souls meant to join matter to realize ourselves

and move on to the next stage. Depending on traditional beliefs, the 'soul' will need to experience and to pass through 7, 49, 64, 99 or 1000 'temporarily' operational modes, or mundane dwellings, before it can be released and move on. That quiver, the *élan*, the entelechy transmuting itself into action is the self-aware action rebounding into matter. Post-ideological redistribution.

Normality does not exist in itself and *per se*, normality is a cultural variable. Culture, as a category of Nature, cannot compete with its maker, it can only follow its laws. Art, as a category of culture, cannot contest its producer, it can only follow its paws. Art has embedded the laws of Nature: it precede Nature when is perceived as the network connecting all its points; and, conversely, it is seen as the power that conforms Nature itself from within. *Natura natura* and *natura naturata.* To draw distinctions is the prerogative of the thinking mind due to its intimate binary structure, its dualistic feature, its *natura naturata*'s 'network'. Art is a pre-text, an ur-text, an eigen-text, an undifferentiated compound of knowledge that proceeds the text and, at the same *time*, is a pretext to convey novelty, not in the essence, but in the way it manifests and shapes itself and nature. Culture does not germinate in the context of an arbitrary quantum vacuum, rather it is engendered in the dimension we inhabit when the link between the inner and the outer is set firm. An inner world that does not dialogue and relate with the outer, with the 'other', is a world deprived of any reality. Indigenous culture are based on insights and inner knowledge, on native attainments and cognitions of the Real organized in well proved systems, inherited and transmitted to the benefit of the community, closer to their own roots than to any contemporary developed societies, and from whom much can be learned. Verily, it is the great varieties of cultures which make this world so vibrant, so diverse, so intriguing and puzzling. The intermingling of cultures has always made new branches flourish: the Sumerian, the Egyptian, the Chinese, the ancient Greek, the Roman, the Mozarab, the Javanese, the Italian Renaissance, the Moghul, just to name a few, are all examples of blending and stratification of previous imports.

If the new paradigm needs to be formulated and enacted, these operative annotations on the field are a plain contribution. Bear with me for severing the thread, but this piece needs now to go to press and a further occasion will certainly arise. In the meantime, enjoy a few examples of vital indigenous cultures interacting with individual and social development collected in the issue, another token that things are moving in all quarters, changing and empowering transformation.   ◪

CONVERSATION-BASED DEVELOPMENT

MOSTAFA KAMAL TOLBA

Dr Mostafa Tolba (Zifta, Cairo, Egypt, 1922) graduated from Cairo University in 1943, and obtained his Ph.D from the Imperial College in 1948. He returned to Cairo to eventually become Professor in the Faculty of Science at Cairo University, where he established his own school in microbiology and is currently Emeritus Professor. He was also Professor in Baghdad University (1954-1959). Dr Tolba joined the Egyptian civil service as Undersecretary of State for Higher Education and Minister of Youth, and on the international scene, as an alternate member of UNESCO Executive Board. He became the first president of the newly established Academy for Scientific Research and Technology in 1971. In 1972, he led Egypt's delegation to the Stockholm conference on the Human Environment, thus starting a lifetime commitment to environmental issues. Immediately after Stockholm he was nominated as Deputy Executive Director of the newly established United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Within two years, he became the Executive Director - a post he held until retiring at the end of 1992.

Pursuing his position during Stockholm, he diligently promoted his philosophy of "Development without Destruction". It implications are clearly reflected in his speeches, books and in UNEP's programmes, in many fields, and at many levels.

Dr Tolba has published over 95 papers on plant diseases and more than 600 statements and articles on the environment. He has received many awards and prizes, honorary doctorates, awards, medals, and high decorations both from academic institutions, governments and NGOs.

In 1994 he established in Cairo the International Center for Environment and Development (ICED), a non profit organization, financing environmental projects in less developed countries. He is the president of Centre for Environment and Our Common Past (ECOPAST) dealing with the impact of the air pollution on cultural heritage, and chairman of the Egyptian Consultants for Environment and Development (ECED), and member of many academies, institutes, committees and other organizations.

→I OVERVIEW

> **" *Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few.* "**
>
> **DAVID HUME**

HUMAN BEINGS, IN THEIR QUEST FOR economic development and enjoyment of the riches of nature, must come to terms with the reality of resource limitation and the carrying capacities of ecosystems, and must take account of the needs of future generations. This is the message of conversation. For, if the object of development is to provide for social and economic welfare, the object of conversation is to ensure Earth's capacity to sustain development and to support life.

Two features characterize our time: the first, is the almost limitless capacity of human beings for building and creation, matched by equally great powers of destruction and annihilation. The escalating needs of soaring numbers have often driven people to take a short- sighted approach when exploiting natural resources for building and creation as well as for destruction.

The second, is the global interrelatedness of actions, with its corollary of global responsibility. This in turn gives rise to the need for global co-operation both for development and for conversation of nature and natural resources.

Earth is the only place in the universe known to sustain life. Yet human activities are progressively reducing the planet's life- supporting capacity at a time when rising human numbers and consumption are making increasingly heavy demands on it. The combined destructive impacts of a poor majority struggling to stay alive and an affluent minority consuming most of the world's resources are undermining the very means by which all people can survive and flourish. The toll of these heavy demands has now become glaringly apparent: a long list of hazards and disasters, including soil erosion, desertification, loss of cropland, pollution, deforestation, ecosystem degradation and destruction, and extinction of species and varieties. This situation underlines the need for conversation, comprising the ecologically sound management of productive systems and the maintenance of their viability and versatility.

Humanity's relationship with the biosphere (the thin covering of the planet that contains and sustains life)

will continue to deteriorate until a new international economic order is achieved, a new environmental ethic adopted, human populations stabilize, and sustainable modes of development become the rule rather than the exception. Among the prerequisites for sustainable development is the conversation of living resources.

Development is the modification of the biosphere and the application of technical, financial, living and non-living resources to satisfy human needs and improve the quality of human life. For development to be sustainable it must take account of the short term advantages and disadvantages of alternative actions.

Conversation is the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations. Thus conversation embraces preservation, maintenance, sustainable utilization, restoration and enhancement of the natural environment. Living resources conversation is especially concerned with plants, animals and microorganisms and with those non-living elements of the environment on which they depend. Living resources have two important properties the combination of which distinguishes them from non-living resources: they are renewable if conserved; and they are destructible if not. Conversation's concern for maintenance and sustainability is a rational response to the nature of living resources (renewability + destructibility) and also an ethical imperative, expressed in the belief that "we have not inherited the earth from our parents, we have borrowed it from our children.

Conversation is a process to be applied cross-sectrolly, not an activity sector in its own right. In the case of sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry and wildlife directly responsible for the management of living resources, conversation is that aspect of management which ensures that the fullest sustainable advantage is derived from the living resources base and that activities are so located and conducted that the resource base is maintained.

Living resource conversation has three specific objectives:

a ⁓ To maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems (such as soil regeneration and protection, the recycling of nutrients, and the cleansing of waters), on which human survival and development depend.

b ⁓ To preserve genetic diversity (the range of genetic material found in the world's organisms), on which depend the breeding programmes necessary for the protection and improvement of

cultivated plants and domesticated animals, as well as much scientific advance, technical innovation, and the security of the many industries that use living resources.

c ⁓ To ensure the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems (notably fish and other wildlife, forests and grazing lands) which support millions of rural communities.

That conversation and sustainable development are mutually dependent can be illustrated by the plight of the rural poor. The dependence of the rural communities on living resources is direct and immediate. For the 500 million people who are malnourished, or the 1500 million people whose only fuel is wood, dung or crop wastes, or the almost 800 million people with incomes of USD 50 or less a year, for all these people, conversation is the only thing between them and, at best, abject misery, at worst, death. Unhappily, people on the margins of survival are compelled by their poverty – and their consequent vulnerability to destroy the few resources available to them. In widening circles around their villages they strip trees and shrubs for fuel until the plants wither away and the villagers are forced to burn dung and stubble. The 400 million tonnes of dung and crop wastes that rural people burn annually are badly needed to regenerate soils already highly vulnerable to erosion now that the plants that bind them are disappearing.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that conversation is a sufficient response to such problems. People whose very survival is precarious and whose prospects of even temporary prosperity are bleak can not be expected to respond sympathetically to calls to subordinate their acute short term needs to the possibility of long term returns. Conversation must therefore be combined with measures to meet short term economic needs. The vicious circle by which poverty causes ecological degradation which in turn leads to more poverty can be broken only by development. But if it is not to be self-defeating, it must be development that is sustainable and conversation helps to make it so. The development efforts of many developing countries are being slowed or compromised by lack of conversation. In Southeast Asia, excessive clearing of forests has caused fluctuations in river flow that are lowering rice yields. Throughout the developing world, the lifetimes of hydroelectric power stations and water supply systems are being cut as reservoirs silt up because siltation is accelerated by deforestation, overgrazing and other unwise land uses.

Activities of every organism modify its environment and those of human beings are no exception. Although environmental modification is both natural and a necessary part of development, this does not mean that all modifications lead to development nor does that preservation impedes it. While it is inevitable that most of the planet will be modified by people and that much of it will be transformed, it is

not at all correct to consider that such alterations will achieve the social and economic objectives of development. Unless it is guided by ecological, as well as by other environmental and by social, cultural and ethical considerations, much development will continue to have undesired effects, to provide reduced benefits or even to fail altogether. There is a close relationship between failure to achieve the objectives of conversation and failure to achieve the social and economic objectives of development, or, having achieved them, to sustain those achievements. The integration of conversation and development ensures that modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and wellbeing of all people.

The main obstacles to achieving conversation are:

a ~ The belief that living resource conversation is a limited sector, rather than a process that cuts across and must be considered by all sectors;

b ~ The consequent failure to integrate conversation with development;

c ~ A development process that is often inflexible and needlessly destructive, due to inadequacies in environmental planning, a lack of rational use allocation and undue emphasis on narrow short term interest rather than broader longer term ones;

d ~ The lack of a capacity to converse, due to inadequate legislation and lack of enforcement; poor organization (notably government agencies with insufficient mandates and a lack of coordination) ; lack of trained personnel; a lack of basic information on the productive and regenerative capacities of living resources, and on the trade-offs between one management option and another;

e ~ The lack of support for conversation, due to a lack of awareness (other than at the most superficial level) of the benefits of conversation and of the responsibility to converse among those who use or have an impact on living resources, including in many cases, governments;

f ~ The failure to deliver conversation – based development where it is most needed, notably the rural areas of developing countries.

The Priority Requirements For Achieving Conversation -Based Development:

1 ~ Reserve good cropland for crops: in view of the scarcity of high quality arable land and rising demand for food and other agricultural products, land that is most suitable for crops should be reserved for agriculture.

2 ~ Manage cropland to high ecological standards. This requires soil and water conversation, the recycling of nutrients, and retention of the habitants of organisms beneficial to agriculture, and the return of residues and livestock wastes, as far as possible, to the land.

3 ~ Many tropical soils quickly lose their fertility. Traditional systems of shifting cultivation restored fertility by leaving the land fallow for long periods, but fertilizers are indispensable for continuous cropping. Manufactured fertilizers are beyond the means of many developing country farmers because of their high cost, low prices of farm products, shortage of credit and a lack of fertilizers supplies. The estimated 113 million tonnes of plant nutrients that are potentially available to developing countries from human and livestock wastes and from crop residues should as far as possible be used to fertilize the land.

4 ~ Ensure that the principle management goal for watershed forests is protection of the watershed. This is particularly important in the upper catchment areas where rivers originate and where often rainfall is greatest. Especially fragile or critical areas, notably steep slopes with erodible soils, and the source areas of major rivers should never be cleared.

5 ~ Ensure that the principle management goal for estuaries, mangrove swaps and other coastal wetlands and shallows critical for fisheries is the maintenance of the elements on which the fisheries depend.

6 ~ Control the discharge of pollutants. The discharge of pollutants and use of pesticides and other toxic substances should be controlled. Since the effects on ecosystems and species of the thousands of chemicals that enter the environment are largely unknown, contentious monitoring of the ecosystems should be undertaken.

7 ~ Prevent the extinction of species. Priority should be given to species that are endangered throughout their range and to species that are the sole representatives of their family or genus. Prevention of extinction requires sound planning, allocation and management of land and water uses, supported by on site(in situ) preservation in protected areas and off site (ex situ) protection such as in zoos and botanical gardens.

8 ~ Preserve as many varieties as possible of crop plants, forage plants, timber trees, livestock, animals for aquaculture, microbes and other domesticated organisms and their wild relatives. Priority should be given to those varieties that are most threatened and are most needed for national and international breeding programmes. This requires both off site and on site preservation and may be assisted by participation in international programmes for the preservation of genetic resources.

9 ~ Ensure that site preservation programmes protect: the wild relatives of economically valuable and other useful plants and animals and their habitants; the habitants of threatened and unique species; unique ecosystems; and representative samples of ecosystem types.

10 ~ Determine the size, distribution and management of protected areas on the basis of the

needs of the ecosystems and the plant and animal communities they are intended to protect.

11 ⁓ Adopt conservative management objectives for the utilization of species and ecosystems.

12 ⁓ Determine the productive capacities of exploited resources and ensure that access to a resource does not exceed the resource's capacity to sustain exploitation. Measures to regulate utilization can include: restricting the total take, the number of persons, vessels or other units allowed to participate in exploitation; and prohibiting or restricting the use of certain methods and equipment. A combination of quotas and restrictions on access to the resource is usually essential.

13 ⁓ Reduce excessive yields to sustainable levels. Industries, communities and countries that are overexploiting living resources on which they depend would be better off in the medium and long term if they voluntarily reduce their exploitation to levels that are sustainable. In this way they could adjust to realistic levels of consumption and trade and avoid unexpected drops in yield, instead of being surprised by them when they occurred.

14 ⁓ Equip subsistence communities to utilize resources sustainably. Where a community depending for subsistence wholly or partly on living resources regulates utilization so that it is sustainable, its regulatory measures should be supported.

15 ⁓ Maintain the habitats of resource species. Where agriculture can supply more food, more economically and on a sustainable basis than can the utilization of wildlife, the conversion of wildlife habitat to farmland is rational. Often, however, the habitats of wildlife are destroyed for short-lived agriculture and other developments with a net loss in welfare for the local communities.

16 ⁓ Regulate international trade in wild plants and animals.

17 ⁓ Allocate timber concessions with care and manage them to high standards.

18 ⁓ Limit firewood consumption to sustainable levels.

AND FINALLY

Regulate the stocking of grazing lands so that the long term productivity of plants and animals can be maintained. The carrying capacity of grazing lands is determined by the annual production of plant growth in excess of what is required by the plants for their metabolism, health and vigour. Much of this excess production can be cropped by wild animals or livestock without damage to the vegetation, Careless or excessive use, however, impairs the plants' capacity to grow and reproduce. This in turn leads to, sometimes, permanent destruction of the vegetation or to a decline in the proportion of plants palatable to livestock or both. In arid regions, where rainfall and plant growth are erratic, stocking densities must be more conservative than where annual productivity is more consistent. In such regions nomadism and transhumance (the seasonal movement of livestock) are often the most sustainable strategies and, if still practised should not be abandoned without good reasons.

All these priorities are doable, if there is enough knowledge of the nature of what is around us, enough trained personnel, public awareness to support these activities and a strong political will to achieve a conversation – based development. ◾

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DEVELOPMENT, IDENTITY & HERITAGE

THE SIBIU COUNTY ECOMUSEUM

TEODORA HASEGAN

Teodora Corina Hasegan holds a PhD in anthropology from Binghamton University, State University of New York, USA, where she is a Research Associate. She is also Director of Research and Development for "Peoples of the World Foundation. Education for and about Indigenous People" where she is involved in the day-to-day operation of the Foundation, fundraising, promotion and advising. She also conducts research and field assignments related to issues affecting indigenous peoples, and contributes to the Foundation's web site. Email: thasega1@binghamton.edu

INTRODUCTION

T HE POLITICAL CHANGES (transition to democracy and capitalism) that began in 1989 in the former communist Central and East European countries represented only the starting point of more complex transformations of society. The European Union (EU) is one of the transnational actors that caused changes in this region. For Romania, the process of European integration meant a reevaluation of the relation between its history, heritage and identity. In the context of Sibiu European Capital of Culture 2007 programme, initiated by the European Commission, heritage is an essential part of different strategies used by local people in Sibiu city and region to promote economic, social, and cultural development and to increase the global competitiveness of regions (in this specific case, Transylvania). The issue of rural heritage is strongly related to that of cultural and natural landscape that constitutes a foundation of peoples' identity.

The first ecomuseum in Romania – Sibiu County Ecomuseum *(Ecomuzeul Regional Sibiu)* – is an example of how heritage, landscape and identity were linked and gained more importance in the context of the Sibiu ECC 2007 programme. Ecomuseum is an example of 'heritagescape'. Neither wholly museum nor entirely landscape, a heritagescape incorporates elements from both, making them a unique and complex social space. Heritagescape is distinct from but at the same time an integral part of the larger landscape in which it is located. Following Appadurai (1996)'s scheme of five dimensions of global cultural flow – 'ethnoscapes', 'mediascapes', 'technoscapes', 'finacescapes' and 'ideoscapes' – that are constantly at play in today's deterritorialized world, Garden (2006: 3, 5, 14) introduces the concept of 'heritagescape' and explains:

> Like the larger landscape, the heritagescape is more than the sum of its physical components and, while centered on the site itself, it may not necessarily be restricted to the physical limits of the place. In thinking of heritage sites as heritagescapes – i.e., as landscapes – it draws attention to their qualities as dynamic, changing space.

The Sibiu County Ecomuseum demonstrates how tradition is being changed in the context of the European integration process in Romania. The Sibiu County Ecomuseum aims to preserve the natural and cultural heritage in rural areas by combining in situ museum, involvement of local community and the development of tourist products representative for an ecomuseum. The project is significant for showing that cultural tourism gained a new relevance for Romania after the EU accession. Rural areas in many areas of Europe have turned to tourism as an alternative development strategy in the face of changes to the agricultural food production system. Particularly in more remote and less agriculturally viable areas, national and European policies have concentrated on encouraging 'bottom-up' development based on the commodification of local cultural resources or knowledge. In the Territorial Agenda of the EU, cities are seen as regional centers, but the need for urban-rural partnership is also acknowledged. Sibiu was seen as the proof of the interreligious and intercultural dialogue, but also as the proof of the dialogue between rural and urban heritage. Rural heritage is an important part of

Romania, a symbol of the connection between cultural heritage and landscape. The Sibiu County Ecomuseum shows the complex ways in which such initiatives intersect with existent historical configurations and at the same time shape newer social relations. These initiatives change the ways local knowledge is valued and contribute to creating different senses of place identity.

THE SIBU COUNTY ECOMUSEUM

The Sibiu County Ecomuseum is a project developed by the French NGO 'GAIA Heritage,' the Sibiu County Council and the ASTRA National Museum Complex.

The ecomuseum is an instrument for the local community to control its changing process:

> The tourists go to an ecomuseum to learn about a specific geographical space, a heritage, the people where they live. This creates a direct relation with them, unlike in a museum where there is no direct connection to the people who made the displayed objects. Our hope is that local people living in these localities become aware of their heritage and how they could protect it. (The Sibiu County Ecomuseum brochure: no page number).

The logo of the Sibiu County Ecomuseum Association is 'The Wheel of the World', a drawing made by Picu Patrut, an artist from Saliste.

The Sibiu County Ecomuseum brochure and the logo of the Association.

Its aim is to valorize the heritage of Sibiu region. The Sibiu County Ecomuseum includes Romanian villages in Marginimea Sibiului area (Saliste and Gura Raului), villages with Saxon architecture (Biertan, Mosna and Valea Viilor), and villages with valuable built heritage, but very damaged (Sasaus).

While ASTRA NMC includes a village made up of relocated buildings, the ecomuseum maintains buildings in their original locations, fulfilling continuing uses while open to the public and thus generating additional income from tourism.

The presentation brochure for the Sibiu County Ecomuseum states that the Ecomuseum Association (in charge with organizing and managing the ecomuseum) aims to "carry out local and regional development projects; to preserve the folk traditions and customs; and to involve local communities in the protection of the heritage (The Sibiu County Ecomuseum brochure: no page numbers). The same brochure explains that the Sibiu County Ecomuseum project is based on modern principles for preserving the heritage, seen as being constituted not only of objects, but also of the entire area in which they are situated: the community, landscape, history, crafts, specific agricultural and industrial activities preserved 'in situ.' The ecomuseum uses this cultural and natural heritage as a development factor for local community.

As Mihai Halmaghi, the president of the Ecomuseum Association said, it symbolizes the changing nature of life and the heritage that is left by everyone. The logo reads: "The inconsistent wheel of life and its dangerous waves. I will inherit. I inherit. I have inherited. Ashes to ashes." And also it invites the tourist to "Explore a village and discover centuries old architecture and traditional ways of life."

The initiative of setting up the ecomuseum was a national premiere. The ecomuseum is an alternative to the classical museums. The next section addresses a brief history of the ecomuseum concept.

BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE ECOMUSEUM CONCEPT

Over the past two decades there has been a change in the understanding of the museums' role in society. One aspect of this is that museums have been trying to attract and build "deeper relationships with more diverse audiences" (Spitz and Thom 2003: 3). Museums have also built a closer relationship with their communities. Examples of museums which have organized such programs are diverse, and range from universal survey museums and city museums to indigenous-run cultural centers (Nakamura 2007: 148). Some of the results of these projects are discussed in different studies

(e.g., Fuller 1992; Davis 1999; Peers and Brown 2003; Spitz and Thom 2003; Clifford 2004; Hendry 2005; for a more detailed history of ecomuseums, see Maggi and Falleti 2000).

The development of community projects has been accompanied by a change of perspective that places emphasis on culture and cultural heritage. The ecomuseum has proved successful in providing a new way of transmitting cultural knowledge. An ecomuseum is an agent for managing change that links education, culture, and power. "[A]n ecomuseum recognizes the importance of culture in the development of self-identity and its role in helping a community adjust to rapid change. The ecomuseum thus becomes a tool for the economic, social, and political growth and development of the society from which it springs" (Fuller 1992: 328).

The ecomuseum movement started in France in the early 1970s and spread internationally (see Corsane and Holleman 1993; Davis 1999). The idea of the 'integrated museum', a more socially inclusive form of cultural institution, was a key outcome from the Round Table on the Development and the Role of Museums in the Contemporary World, a joint meeting between the UNESCO and the International Council of Museums (ICOM) held in Santiago de Chile, Chile, from 20 to 31 May 1972. It prompted movement toward creating real community museums (Hoobler 2006: 447). The ecomuseum has the potential to be a socially inclusive mechanism and is now a worldwide phenomenon (Davis 2004: 5). The movement has become strong in numerous countries, but most noticeably in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, China, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, India and Taiwan, Province of China.

Two key proponents were the French museologists Georges Henri Rivière and Hugues de Varine. Rivière's belief was that an ecomuseum is an instrument conceived, and operated jointly by a public authority and a local population:

> It is a mirror that the local population holds up to its visitors so that it may be better understood and so that its industry, customs and identity may command respect. It is a laboratory, in so far as it contributes to the study of the past and present of the population concerned and of its environment and promotes the training of specialists. It is a conservation centre, in so far as it helps to preserve and develop the natural and cultural heritage of the population. It is a school, in so far as it involves the population in its work of study and protection and encourages it to have a clearer grasp of its own future (Rivière 1985: 182).

Hugues de Varine and Rene Rivard (1984, 1988; see also Boylan 1992; Davis 1999) have provided the most useful definition by comparing the traditional museum (=building+collections+experts+public) to the ecomuseum (=territory+heritage+memory+population). However, although there are common ecomuseum characteristics, ecomuseums also have distinct traits because they respond to shifting local environmental, economic, social, cultural and political needs

(Corsane 2006: 404). In museums, heritage is exhibited as objects of past. In the ecomuseum – this museum without walls – it is a sign of a past that is still alive. The ecomuseum casts its inhabitants as actors of their own story and also spectators of their own exhibition. The ecomuseums allow the villages not only to preserve and reinforce their past, but to influence their present and shape their future. There are also risks associated with the status of ecomuseum: "The loss of a sense of place […] promoted by the 'heritagization' of history" (Walsh 1992: 68; see also Graham et al. 2000).

The Marginimea Sibiului ('The Edge of Sibiu') area lies at the foot of the Cibin Mountains in the Southwestern part of Sibiu County and consists of several small villages. Marginimea Sibiului has been recognized as epitomizing Romanian rural civilization but also Saxon traditions. Shepherds built pine houses, with tall roofs. People here have been breeding animals since old times. Shepherds took their sheep to the pastures, crossing the Danube and even to Constantinople and the Adriatic, beyond the Tisza River, in Poland, and to the East, up to the Caucasus. Over time, the region flourished as a trade center, becoming one of the most renowned centers for leather and wool, which are a proof of the craftsmanship of the peoples in Marginimea Sibiului. Products made in Marginimea Sibiului were traded throughout Europe and even as far away as America. Among the well-known villages in the Marginimea Sibiului are Saliste, Sibiel, Tilisca, Rasinari, Poiana Sibiului, Miercurea Sibiului, Poplaca, Orlat, Fantanele, Jina. In present times, this craftsmanship of breeding faces difficulties:

> 2007 was the year for celebrating 125 years since the founding of the only craftsmen's association in Romania that is still active, and currently has 41 members [...]. There are big challenges and gloomy perspectives ahead of these craftsmen. They can access EU funds but their needs are many in terms of supplies and markets for selling their products [...]. This is a crucial moment for the continuation of rural traditions. After the migrations of the local Romanian population known as 'roiri' ('pastoral', 'commercial' and 'crafting') [to cities], followed by the big migration of the Saxon population in the last decades of the twentieth century [to Germany], we are now witnessing the most serious crisis in the villages in Romania. It is a complex crisis caused by the population growing old, migration of the young people [to cities or abroad], and the lack of any means and sources for survival and decent living. (Mihai Halmaghi, president of the Sibiu Ecomuseum Association, in Tribuna, 17 January 2008, author's translation).

The craftsmen's association mentioned in this quote is the Craftsmen's Assembly (Reuniunea Meseriasilor), a regional association set up in Sibiu in 1882. In 1892, a similar Assembly was founded in Saliste as a professional association. The Assembly represented a

significant step in the development of local crafts, which initially included ten crafts: furriers, hammer smiths, carpenters, brick layers, shoemakers, boot makers, leather dressers, drapers, strap makers and wheelwrights.

Saliste was founded in 1354 as a large Romanian village. The settlement flourished in the nineteenth century as a burg, a small town with agricultural and commercial activities. In 2003, due to cultural and economic development, Saliste gained urban status. Different traditional crafts are representative for *Marginimea Sibiului*: hand-loom weaving, woodcarving, leather processing, stone working and woolen handicrafts.

tradition for generations in Ilies' family: Virgil learned this craft from his father, and now his two boys, Radu and Daniel, are working with him" (Formula As, 1999). He has a strong motivation for wanting to preserve this skill: "I am selling to maintain my identity."

The Sibiu County Ecomuseum in Saliste includes: a carpenter and wood carver's shop-dwelling, a leather goods workshop, store and dwelling, a flour mill, a blacksmith's workshop and an old wooden beam house.

At the inauguration of the ecomuseum in Saliste, Vasile Crisan (the director of the Sibiu County Department for Culture, Religion and National

Virgil Ilies' hat-making workshop and the carpenter's workshop in Saliste.

There are only six households where barrel-making is still practiced in Saliste, but it is not known for how long. One problem for the craftsmen is that the materials they work with are very expensive. At the inauguration of the Ecomuseum in Saliste, two of the craftsmen said they will change their job the following year, the others were saying: "What can we do if this is the only thing we know how to do?" One solution was offered by the mayor of Saliste, Teodor Banciu, who opined the wood makers could sell small barrels as souvenirs to tourists coming in Saliste (Monitorul de Sibiu, 24 January 2008). Virgil Ilies, a craftsman from Saliste, said craftsmen are able to adapt to the current market needs but that "We lose ourselves as a nation if we do not preserve our language, folk costumes and customs" (The Sibiu County Ecomuseum inauguration in Sibiu, 13 July 2007, personal notes). Virgil Ilies' hat making workshop, the only one left in Saliste, is in a long courtyard, with a big, wooden gate.

The 'fortress-house' is of Saxon influence, but his skill is Romanian. The hat-maker is the only maker of Romanian traditional shepherds' hats (called 'clop' in Romanian): a round and black hat, specific to the shepherds in Sibiu area. But the workshop has evolved over time to produce cowboy hats and ladies' hats. "Hat making has been a

Cultural Heritage) said that the ecomuseum is a first step to develop tourism in Saliste. He also warned about some risks involved in this project and brought as an example the case of Sibiel, a village in Marginimea Sibiului, where the development of tourism triggered a degradation of the village. Teofil Gherca, the representative of the GAIA Heritage NGO (which is one of the organizers of the Sibiu County Ecomuseum), explained that the majority of the ecomuseums in Europe opened during situations of crisis (for example, in France, when villages started to disappear, when a mine closed down, and with it a whole history around it):

We are in Romania at a crossroads, regarding rural life, crafts, agriculture, animal husbandry. The ecomuseum comes as a tool for the local communities to help them come together, evaluate what is left, what they can do, how they present themselves to others. The ecomuseum appears in Romania also in a situation of crisis of the villages. Very few people here are really interested not only in preserving the houses, but also their significance (for example, a house was built as a workshop). (Teofil Gherca, the Sibiu County Ecomuseum inauguration, personal notes).

The Sibiu County Ecomuseum in Gales (a village part of Saliste town) includes a hat-maker's workshop and a traditional water mill. The ecomuseum in Sasaus included houses where the specific architecture

was preserved and also a small Greek-Catholic church exhibiting church objects, photographs, textiles and folk art.

The ecomuseum in Biertan aimed for economic development and for maintaining the authenticity of the houses' architecture and workshops. The Biertan commune is made up of three localities: Biertan, Copsa Mare and Richis. Saxon colonists, one of the first Saxon settlements in Transylvania, established the ecomuseum in 1230. At the end of the twentieth century, the Saxon ethnics left the

show their heritage to the visitors. The visitor walks up on the trail near the Saxon fortified church, and goes down on the path near the Romanian church. These two churches reflect, in fact, the two significant components of today's Biertan: the Saxon heritage and the Romanian one.

Valea Viilor village is a very distinctive place, with its 700-year old fortified church. The village's name translates to 'The Valley of the Vines' and is also known under the Saxon name of 'Wurmloch'. The ecomuseum includes a Romanian house, two old

The carpenter's workshop and view of Biertan with the fortified church in the background.

settling and in 1990 only a few families were present. Later, the Saxon population returned as Biertan emerged as a Saxon spiritual center. The fortified church in Biertan (a historic monument and an architectural masterpiece included on the UNESCO World Heritage Sites list) is illustrative for the entire area that was colonized by the Saxons in Transylvania.

The ecomuseum in Biertan includes: a pharmaceutical garden, the environing hills, the Romanian neighborhood, a cooper's workshop and a flour mill, a carpenter's workshop specialized in carving shutters, and a therapeutic and homeopathic drugstore established in 1809 in the oldest building in Biertan founded in 1572.

The inauguration of the ecomuseum in Biertan tour is so designed that the visitor passes through the pharmaceutical garden and continues on a small trail up on a hill from where the visitor could enjoy a panoramic view of Biertan.

The grand fortified church dominates this view. The path winds down through a cemetery and near the Romanian church, in a beautiful garden. The feeling the visitor gets is that even if the ancestors are no longer present, their knowledge and skills are still alive. Those that keep these skills alive are like those who chose to be part of the ecomuseum project to

Saxon houses, the old priest house, the old mill, the house where the famous musician Martian Negrea was born, and the Romanian neighborhood. In 1939 the Evangelical community of Valea Viilor had 928 members, though by 2004 there were only twenty members remaining. Nowadays, there are only four Saxon families left in the village. The visit included a glass-maker workshop where they make beautiful big glass vases.

When visiting the old Orthodox church, the local priest spoke about the importance of heritage in maintaining one's identity: "We do not have to forget that our ancestors prayed in these churches, tried to embellish them and preserve them" (The local priest, personal notes). That is why the ecomuseum has a significant role: "The ecomuseum aims to reinvigorate our traditions, our crafts and the occupation of animal breeding and to raise people's awareness of the fact that we can not survive without them" (Halmaghi, personal notes).

The reinvigoration of traditions was also made evident during the inauguration of the Sibiu County Ecomuseum in Mosna, which includes a traditional Saxon house, the former communal kindergarten, the communal flour mill – a traditional, electrically-

powered mill provided with millstones (purchased from France), two households with sheds to the front, and the Evangelical parish house.

The main occupations of the local people are agriculture, cattle breeding, beekeeping, hunting, fishing, and harvesting of medicinal plants and of plants to obtain natural dyes. The local people in Mosna were very interested in the ecomuseum project; they saw it as an opportunity for the development of their village based on its heritage, including buildings and crafts. But as Mihai Halmaghi advised one owner of a house part of ecomuseum, they now have to know how to be guides of their own houses, how to 'tell a story.'

a strategy to promote tourism, economic development, and rural and urban regeneration. Places are increasingly being restructured as centers for consumption (Urry 1995:1) and cultural industries, including heritage, have become crucial to the economic and cultural transformation of different places, in Romania and in wider Europe.   ◼

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House with shed in front in Mosna and the glass maker workshop in Valea Viilor.

CONCLUSION

Understood as a force for the transformation of European society and culture, the European integration has an impact on and interacts with local debates over culture, politics and identity. This article argued that for Romania the process of EU integration meant a reevaluation of the relation between its heritage and identity. This article looked at how, in the context of Sibiu ECC 2007 programme, heritage is an essential part of different strategies used by local people in Sibiu city and region to promote economic, social, and cultural development and to strengthen regional identities and increase the global competitiveness of regions (in this case, Transylvania). The rural heritage is seen as a significant part in promoting national identity.

Contrary to the expectations that European integration would act as a force, somehow erasing tradition, the investigation in this article aimed to reveal that integration might more accurately be said to have brought a new revival of the idea of tradition. The Sibiu County Ecomuseum was chosen as an example also of the way in which the integration has intensified the process of linking identity, heritage and place.

Heritage is an economic resource ("the commodification of memory", as Urry [1995: 27] says), used as

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All photographs are by the Authoress.

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
THE SOVIET LEGACY AND THE FUTURE

OF LANGUAGE POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

DIANA RAMAZANOVA

*Diana Ramazanova, a Kazakh national, holds a MSc in Conflict Resolution and Governance from the University of Amsterdam, and a BA in Political Science from the University of California Santa Barbara, US. Diana is currently working on the subject of indigenous language and development at Spanda Foundation in The Hague, Netherlands.
Email: dianakst@gmail.com.*

*F*OLLOWING THE BREAK UP OF SOVIET UNION, THE world witnessed many post-Soviet republics going back to their cultural roots and native languages. During the Soviet era Moscow administration developed effective policies in order to promote and elevate Russian as the dominant language throughout the USSR. As a result, almost all citizens of the majority of republics spoke Russian fluently and in some countries to the extent that their own native languages were abandoned. Such was the case in Kazakhstan, which had the highest percentage of Russian-speaking native population out of all the former Soviet Central Asian republics, such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. As the republic industrialized and developed, the Russian language become more prestigious, offering greater career opportunities and eventually turning into the 'lingua franca' of the Union. Such development indicators as literacy and economic growth therefore negatively impacted indigenous languages such as Kazakh, stripping it of its prior communicative function.

After gaining independence, all the Central Asian republics resolved to return to their former native languages and reinstate them as their respective official state languages. While most did not experience significant problems with this change, Kazakhstan faced major obstacles concerning the language issue. This can be explained by the fact that upon the collapse of the USSR, the country had one of the biggest Russian populations living outside of Russia, with over half of its population native Russian. Secondly,

since a majority of the native Kazakh population did not and still does not speak the Kazakh language, language revival stirred hot debates between 'nationalists' and those who did not speak Kazakh, i.e., ethnic Russians and the Russian speaking ethnic Kazakhs (later referred to as Russophone Kazakhs). The country has a population of 16 million people and the most numerous ethnic groups are: Kazakh 63.1%; Russian 23.7%; Uzbek 2.8%; Ukrainian 2.1%; Uighur 1.4%; Tatar 1.3%; German 1.1%; other 4.5% (2009 census). Thus, its multi-ethnic community makes it challenging for the newly independent state with no previous history of statehood to create a coherent nation with its own national identity. In Europe, the birthplace and architect of the concept of nation-state, most states were formed from relatively homogenous populations and before the age of globalization and easy access to international communication, whereas Kazakhstan became a nation in the early 1990's when technological communication and globalization were already widespread.

Even though at the time of independence the country's economy suffered greatly as a result of being separated from the Soviet command economy, Kazakhstan has experienced the highest economic growth rates out of all Central Asian republics. Its GDP growth rate for 2010, 2009 and 2008 are 7%, 1.2% and 3.2%. The country's GDP per capita has increased from USD 3,200 in 1999 to 12,700 in 2010, making it the most developed state in the region (CIA Factbook). It is therefore interesting to evaluate how the Kazakh indigenous language evolved amidst such extensive economic transformations.

DEVELOPMENT AND TRADITION

The dichotomy that emerged in the 1950's and 1960's in modern sociology and that dominated studies of development and modernization between modern and traditional societies assumed that tradition could not go hand in hand with modernization. Whereas traditional society was defined as a static one with little differentiation and low literacy and urbanization rates, the modern society was viewed as the one having thorough differentiation, high literacy rates, urbanization and a presence of mass media. Traditional society was perceived as

being limited by the cultural horizons set by its tradition, and modern society as being culturally dynamic, oriented to change and innovation. An assumption that existed behind this idea was that the conditions for development in various institutional fields were contingent on continuous extension of specific socio-demographic or structural indices of modernization. In other words, society's modernity was correlated to its features of structural specialization and to the different indices of social mobilization. The greater the specialization, the less traditional, and therefore more capable it is to develop continuously and to deal with new problems and social forces (Eisenstadt 1973:2). From this it appears that development and tradition are two contradicting processes. It is therefore important to trace the impact of the policies directed at reviving the language and tradition on the development in Kazakhstan and the impact the latter had on the former.

The implicit assumption that the less traditional society is, the more capable of sustained growth it is, was proved inconclusive. The socio-demographic indices of modernization cannot reveal whether a viable new modern society, capable of continuous economic growth, will develop. By contrast, many countries that have successfully sustained growth have done so under the "aegis of traditional symbols and by traditional elites" (Eisenstadt 1973:3). Whenever anti-traditional elites promoted modernization, it would be followed by an attempt to revive some of the traditional symbols by the traditional elites. Therefore, recognition followed that though traditional societies typologically differ from modern ones, they vary in the extent to which their traditions hinder or contribute to the transition to modernity. In the cultural sphere all traditional societies can be generalized by a tendency to accept the givenness of some past event, order, or figure (whether real or symbolic) as the major focus of their collective identity. This givenness legitimates changes and delineates the limits of innovation. Access to power becomes restricted and incumbents become "legitimate interpreters of traditions and forgers of the legitimate content and symbols of the social and cultural orders" (Eisenstadt 1973:5). In this case, the Kazakh language, and predominantly its symbolism, becomes a givenness of the past, around which the government forged a collective national identity as part of its nation-building process. Also, as a means of mobilizing support for its policies central government permeates the periphery and the periphery impinges on the center, making the two sides dependent on each other. And since modern soc eties are characterized by a high level of commitment by central government and periphery to common 'ideals' or goals, leaders of modern 'nation-states' place heavy emphasis on the development of common symbols of cultural national identity (Eisenstadt 1973:9).

In Kazakhstan, a nationalist sentiment expressed by the periphery becomes a 'common ideal' that the central government uses to mobilize support for their policies in general and to legitimate political changes they undertake.

Furthermore, the process of modernization is not hindered by tradition. Upon gaining independence, some states have experienced the revival of indigenous tradition as a phase of nationalistic and independence movements. For instance, in India a revival of Indian national identity was "fostered by explicit adoption of customs and styles which were both traditional and closer to popular behavior" (Gusfield 1967:359). The same process is also taking place in Kazakhstan, where the government has established various institutions and organizations aimed at reviving indigenous Kazakh traditions and culture. Several national museums, Kazakh cultural and language centers were opened for public in the country. The new elites of the newly independent nations do not necessarily seek to overcome tradition but instead find ways of synthesizing and blending tradition and modernity. In Kazakhstan the authorities seek to recover from Soviet command economy by launching free-market system values while reminding people of their ancient traditions and languages as means to unify all classes and ethnicities.

The promotion of Kazakh has been used as a means to unify its people under a new national identity, and to rid them of their former Soviet-identification. When the country became independent, Kazakhs, who never felt a strong Kazakh national attachment before, became a titular group in an independent Kazakhstan with its own flag, anthem, territory, and with most of them not even speaking a word of Kazakh. Whereas it is easy to create symbols such as flags, anthems and a Constitution, it is far more challenging to create an invisible bond that will bring people together, a bond critical at the time of economic crisis and uncertainty. In addition, ethnic heterogeneity may lead to "democratic instability, regional assertiveness, and civil war," which is applicable to Kazakhstan with most of its Russian population concentrated in the north (Laitin 2000:142). Recognizing this, instilling a sense of national identity became part of a political agenda for Kazakh elites. Language contributes to broader unity that serves as way of self-identification and helps to recognize one's relationship and interdependence with other members of the society (Fishman 1972:45). This recognition of interdependence was especially crucial right after the independence for the country that was suffering from high inflation, underdevelopment, skyrocketing crime rates and a feeling of uncertainty among the population. Creating a sense of pride among the people for their country was one of the goals of the government. This was made especially difficult by the fact that Kazakhstan history had been eliminated from school curriculum during the Soviet era, resulting in the absence of the common

historical memories that are usually shared by, and serve to unite, the people in a state.

Moreover, used together with primordialist arguments, language has been one of the most important indicators of ethnicity and nationality during the period of territorial demarcation of Central Asian Soviet Socialist republics (SSR) by the Soviets. Primordialism "refers to the idea that certain cultural attributes and formations possess a prior, overriding and determining influence on people's lives, one that is largely immune to 'rational' interest and political calculation" (Smith 2000:5). Attachments deriving from such cultural attributes as kinship, descent, language, religion, and customs, as well as historical community are compelling and animate a sense of communal belonging that we call ethnic community and form a foundation for the subsequent development of nations and nationalism. Ethnic and national attachments take root from the 'cultural givens' of social existence like contiguity and kinship, language, religion, race and customs. These cultural givens or congruities of blood speech, customs etc. "are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves" (Geertz 1973:259-60). These primordial attachments rely on perception, cognition and belief. Individuals assume that cultural differences are givens and therefore attribute a great importance to these ties. Primordialist arguments are also often used to stress that a real Kazakh is supposed to know Kazakh language, for it is the language of his ancestors.

Therefore, language can be used as one of the main instruments of nationalism and national identity formation, powerful in its authenticity and commonality, elements central to the construction of nationalism. In Kazakhstan, where Kazakh customs, skin color and religion resemble those of other Central Asian countries' cultural and ethnic elements, language is left as the only distinguishing and unique element that separates Kazakh culture and people from other Central Asians as well as from Russians. Nationalism is an "organizationally heightened and elaborated beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of societies acting on behalf of their avowed ethnocultural self-interest" (Fishman 1972:5). Since nationalism has to be organizationally heightened by a society in order for nationalism to emerge, members of one community must believe that there are some unique cultural traits and similarities that they share which are of great importance to them. If one of the prerequisites of nationalism is a feeling of sharing commonalities with other members of one's community then nationalism must seek to expand those commonalities even further. This process, called 'broader unity', serves as a basic component of nationalism because it helps one to "recognize his relationship and interdependence with a human population most of whose members he has never met and to believe that this relationship and interdependence are and

have always been quite naturally rooted in ethnocultural similarities between him and far-flung "kin" (Fishman 1972:7). Recognizing one's relationship and interdependence with a human population is equal to locating oneself within the society consequently identifying oneself as well.

Authenticity is a second component of nationalism because authenticity, purity, and nobility of beliefs, values, and behaviors typify a particular community. No state, no nation, no people and no history of people are like any other and it is the past that holds a nation's authenticity and glory and appears to be a 'root' "from which nationalism derives its dynamism for changing the present and creating the future" (Fishman, 1972:8). Since authenticity serves as a source of dynamism and future change, nationalism and the Kazakh language it emphasizes become the givenness of the past that legitimates change and delineates the limits of innovation. Indeed, nationalism is "a complement to the modernizing processes which are involved in the aspiration toward a unified nation" (Gusfield 1967:359). A common culture that cuts across the segmental and primordial loyalties is a basis for national identity and consensus; without it, sustainable economic growth based on nationhood lacks a foundation for legitimating central authority. Thus, nationalism and traditions, despite the assumption that tradition and modernity are contradicting ideas, appears to be at the center of modernization for the newly independent state, such as Kazakhstan. Also, because language is a key driving force of nationalism, language planning becomes an instrument for authorities in fostering a sense of national identity among its population. Before the vernacular may start serving as a unifying, authenticating and driving force of nationalism and therefore modernity, the state becomes a vehicle for language policies and planning. In Kazakhstan, where the vernacular was used predominantly in rural communities during the Soviet era, the language could not keep pace with new technological and foreign vocabulary. In this light standardization of the language by the state becomes a necessity, and if not undertaken, signifies the defeat and inability of nationalist movement to become a mass movement. In pursuit of meeting the needs of an urban population and modernization, language planning first turns to pre-urban heritage for inspiration. In other words, before language planning can unify a modern society it must first turn to historical usage of the language.

From the theories discussed above it is apparent that modernization is not hindered by the revival of nationalism in a form of language policies and indeed nationalism can create a framework for modernization and be a part of the process of economic growth in a nation-state. Nationalism is also conducive toward creating nationhood for a newly independent state. How the language revival evolves as a process and how successful it is in spreading Kazakh

language amidst significant economic growth is to be presented in the following sections.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ABSENCE OF NATIONAL CONSSCIOUSNESS

Linking language with a glorious past is even more challenging when the majority of native Kazakhs do not speak Kazakh itself and prefer speaking Russian instead. For instance, more than 60% of Kazakhs still spoke Russian fluently in 2000 and this number might even be higher because when Kazakhs are asked about their level of Kazakh they tend to exaggerate and say what is more 'favored' by the society. In addition, in 2001 only 68% of ethnic Kazakhs were satisfied with the current statute that granted Kazakh a level of the state language and Russian of the language of 'interethnic communication,' meaning that there are those who prefer Russian over Kazakh. Indeed during the Soviet era Kazakhstan was the most bilingual republic among all of the Central Asian republics (Peyrouse 2007:486). In addition, there is a group of Kazakhs who do not support extensive nationalizing policies of the government that are likely to expel minorities from the country and institutionalize the values of "Kazakhness" at all levels of society. They do not believe in the political discourse, which aims to recreate an 'original' or an authentic Kazakh identity, free of its Russian and Soviet traits.

It is striking that a majority of people in Kazakhstan do not feel strongly about being 'Kazakh' and some even oppose the prevalence of Kazakh language, when it was the language of their ancestors. Current identity politics and consequently language politics of Kazakhstan first of all can be explained by the absence of Kazakh identity prior to becoming part of tsarist Russia and strongly reflect identity and language politics of the Soviets toward its union republics. Therefore, to fully understand the current language issue and its historical origins it is vital to know the historical background of the Kazakh people as nomads.

The continuing legacy of Soviet identity *(sovetskii chelovek)* that Moscow wished to develop among all of the Soviet ethnicities had a long lasting effect on the Kazakhs even after becoming its own nation-state.

A Second World War veteran from rural area wisiting Almaty.

This surprising absence of a sense of nationalism among the Kazakhs prior to separating from the USSR is due to several reasons. First, unlike other politically dependent countries in Africa and Asia, Kazakh SSR did not develop an independence movement. Second, out of all Central Asian states it was the most integrated state in terms of transformation into a settler colony and learning Russian language during Soviet rule. One of the main reasons for this is a lack of self-determination of the Kazakh people as a nation before becoming a 'colony' of the USSR.

The term *Kazakh* did come into existence until the time of the formation of the Kazakh khanate, i.e. an area governed by a khan, in the fifteenth century (Dave 2007:31). Importantly, the term was not an ethnic category but simply meant a person, who was free as a nomad. Due to confusion caused by newly arrived ethnic groups of Cossaks on the Kazakh steppe territory, the tsarist administration began to name Kazakh nomads as *Kirgiz*. To differentiate Kazakh Kirgiz from the actual Kirgiz ethnic group, who lived south of the Kazakh steppes in the mountains, they called the former as *kirgiz-kaisak* and the latter as *kara-kirgiz*. However, the term did not bear any 'national' or ethnic meaning until the early twentieth century, when the leaders of the first nationalist movement, Alash Orda, began to give it a meaning of *narod* (the people) or 'nation' (Dave 2007:31). Consequently, Kazakh nomads did not have a clearly defined national identity prior to tsarist subordination.

Only from the mid-fifteenth to the late sixteenth century were the Kazakh nomads united into one khanate, yet it was highly decentralized and thus could not withstand external security threats of the Chinese and Mongolians. Since its fall, the nomadic organization consisted of a tripartite system of clan conglomerations or hordes *(zhuz)* dispersed over three natural climatic zones. The titles Elder *(ulu)*, Middle *(orta)* and Younger *(kishi) zhuz* convey the "seniority of their mythical progenitors, and not their size or strength" (Dave 2007:32). Within these *zhuz* there were several clans *(ruy)*, which were the main axis of nomadic organization. Kazakhs had a segmentary lineage system, where a particular unit traces its descent from a single progenitor, while a larger unit is subdivided into smaller components

from parent lineages through a process of segmentation. The nomad was supposed to know his lineage at least to the 7th generation, which was also main determinant of his/her identity. When traveling in the steppes, the first question one was asked was to which '*ru*' one belonged to.

Identities in pre-modern communities were fuzzy and fluid. First, due to the Kazakhs nomadic pastoralist way of living, they were not particularly tied to a territory, and their "notions of community or group solidarity among both nomadic and settled people were anchored in clan and genealogical ties and in local structures" (Dave 2007:39). A lack of a clear identity among the Kazakh nomads was due to an absence of central administration or classification schemes that would enumerate them. Also, several clan identities and clan classifications, which nomads identified themselves with, were never superseded by an overarching state framework that exists in many modern societies. Thus, an absence of such terms as 'ethnicity' and 'national identity' made it easy for the tsarist and Soviet Russia to create a new form of identity for the Kazakhs that could supersede their clan affiliation and thereby assimilate the Kazakhs into their own society.

One of the first ways in which tsarist Russia tried to integrate a Kazakh nomad into its system and begin forging a sense of identity among them is by spreading Russian language education and making a significant change in means of surviving in the tsarist system. If already prior to the tsarist Russia, the economic organization of nomadic pastoralism was displaying major drawbacks because of scarcity of land, lack of water resources and shrinkage of nomadic pastures; the growing immigration of Slavic groups, especially the Cossaks, decreased the grazing land and created a competition for land previously unknown. Between 1885 and 1895 around 35,000 European settlers immigrated into the Kazakh steppes increasing the population density and thus decreasing the grazing land per person (Dave 2007:40). Later, the tsarist policy of forced sedentarism further aggravated the situation. The Kazakhs, who did not have any prior experience with farming, in 1868 began to have taxes levied on the land they used for pasturage and *yurts* (round houses that nomads lived in). All these major changes implemented by the tsarist Russia caused a huge crisis in the pastoral nomadic economy. Tsarist Russia made nomadic pastoralism non-sustainable for the nomads with no other skills or education. These challenges forced the nomads to embrace literacy in order to obtain new skills to survive in the new order, making the Kazakhs more receptive to Russian language and culture.

By introducing a central administration system, spreading literacy and bringing European settlers to the steppes, tsarist Russia took the first steps in forging a Kazakh identity. The main defining factors of nationality for tsarist administration were language, race and territory. Furthermore, the first population census launched by the tsarist government in 1897 marked the initial realization of nomadic Kazakhs' self-consciousness that they were different from the other people living south of their steppes. The census served to separate the peoples of Central Asia and assign each one a separate 'nationality' linking the differences to language and territory, borders of which did not exist in pre-Russian era. It was also the first time imperial Russia differentiated the Kyrgyz (=Kirgiz) ethnic group from the Kazakh one. In addition, after demarcation of internal 'national' borders in 1924-1925, the Russians also introduced such terms as *natsional'nost* (nationality) and *narodnost* (peoplehood) to the vocabulary of Kazakhs, defining the first one as "formed character of an ethnos" and the second one as "lack of territorial, ethnic and linguistic consolidation" (Dave 2007:40). The census of 1926 deduced the nationality of the inhabitants solely relying on the language they spoke. While the process of determining nationality of bilingual groups was arbitrary, one's 'native tongue' would predetermine one's 'nationality' (Dave 2007:40). Census, being a practical tool of enumeration, became an ideological instrument of forging a particular identity prescribed by the authorities. After being told to define themselves along 'national' rather than clan or 'zhuz' lines, national identity for Kazakh nomads eventually began to supersede any previous identities they had before.

'Native language' became a meaningful category and since there existed many ethnicities, tribes, nations and nationalities, Soviets found it problematic to define each term and demarcate the borders according to the borders between all of ethnicities and tribes, language served as a marker of tribal composition. 'Native language' education became a basis of nationality policy and ethnographers depended on language as an indicator of ethnicity (Slezkine 1994:428). As part of the policy called '*korenizatsia*' (indigenization) introduced by Lenin that lasted from 1920 to 1933-34, some 130 languages were spoken with minority languages being raised to a status of literary ones and some were even saved from extinction. By 1928 newspapers were published in 47 languages and books - in 66 languages (compared to 40 in 1913) (Slezkine 1994:431). The promotion of native languages also meant that the speakers of those native languages were also promoted. From 1924-1933 Kazakh membership in the republican Communist party grew from 8% to 53%, and every party in the region had a majority of native members (Suny 1993:104). The 'communal apartment' metaphor, introduced by Slezkine (1994:414), therefore refers to this process in the Soviet politics, where Russia was a kitchen, a common area and the main decision maker, and the rest of the rooms belonged to the republics, which had their own 'territory' and a certain amount of freedom.

Even though *korenizatsia,* contributed to the development of a sense of nationhood among the people

of USSR, the following policy of forced industrialization launched by Stalin limited and undermined nationhood concordantly. With the start of Stalin's industrialization and social transformation, the policy of '*korenizatsia*' was invoked. This brought with it a transformation of previously agrarian societies into industrial urban ones, which in turn required assimilation to a generalized Soviet culture and learning the Russian language. Lenin's doctrine of rapprochement (*sblizhenie)* and merging *(sliyanie)* also played its role in limiting the national identities of republics and contributed to the development of one common Soviet identity, of *sovetski chelovek*. Therefore, a paradox of some sort took place: on the one hand *korenizatsia* gave birth to

more centralized, the language debate began to favor Russian as the 'lingua franca'. The Resolution *On the Obligatory Study of the Russian Language in Schools of National Republics and Regions* (1938) proclaimed that Russian would be a mandatory language in all Soviet schools (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001:54). Latin script, adopted in 1929, was also changed to Cyrillic by 1940. This shift clearly demonstrated the Soviet leaders' intention to link Kazakhs (and other partitular ethnicities) to Russians, promoting the de jure equality of all languages while de facto favoring Russian. Publications in Russian began to exceed those printed in titular languages. Russian was also encouraged at school, while titular languages became elective courses.

Green bazaar in the capital city Almaty.

the idea of discrete nations and nationalities, and on the other hand, subsequent state policies promoted integration into a common Soviet culture and Russian language. This can be seen by such government actions towards Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics as codification and standardization of local languages, manipulation of vocabulary and removal of foreign accretions (mainly Persian and Arabic), and introduction of Russian as a language of inter-ethnic communication (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001:53). Also, Russian was employed in government, industrial and commercial enterprises which led to a shift among the elites towards using Russian instead of their titular language. Gradually, the challenge of balancing identity through language, where native tongues carried emotional as well as possible nationalist sentiments, and Russian used as a common tool between various ethnicities, in an era of industrialization and common economic space, became of a central concern for the apparatus. With the Union becoming

Previously, if the ethnic Russians, unlike the rest of ethnic groups, lacked a sense of Russianness and national cultural institutions, by the early 1930's that situation changed. The Party began endowing Russians with national past, national language and a growing national iconography. The Party placed emphasis on the 'friendship of peoples' and 'internationalism' dogmas, referring to close ties between all nationalities in the USSR, yet expressed them solely in Russian, underscoring the language's unifying function. Although Russian was not proclaimed a state language, it served as a main component in the consolidation of all ethnicities within the Soviet Union. Russification was also part of the "concentrated effort to obliterate the collective national memory of all peoples in the Union" (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001:55). As Slezkine (1994:444) elaborates on his metaphor: "The Russians began to bully their neighbors and decorate their part of the communal apartment […] but they did not claim the whole apartment was theirs nor that the other (large) families

were entitled to their own rooms. The tenants were increasingly unequal but reassuringly separate."

The turning point in the process of Russification was the Decree on *Measures for Further Improving the Study and Teaching of the Russian Language in the Union Republics* (1978) that called for a new syllabus for the Russian language and better textbooks and teaching aid for all schools. Russian was also given a larger share as language of instruction and was prescribed for pre-school establishments (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001:57). Although Russian was a language of inter-ethnic communication, it was the main language of instruction in institutions of higher education and professional technical schools. As a result, more and more people in Kazakhstan claimed to speak Russian. According to the Soviet population

in a form of protests in Almaty in 1986 carrying ethnic character. Thousands of young Kazakhs protested against the removal of Dinmukhamed Kunaev- an ethnic Kazakh- and appointment of Gennadi Kolbin – an ethnic Russian – as a secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party. In light of these ethnic disturbances the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers and Kazakhstan Communist Party decided to adopt a resolution *On Improving the Study of the Kazakh Language* (1987) (Fierman 1998:175). Although this resolution did not confer great power upon Kazakh language, it was an important step since Kazakh language had not been given even nominal support in the previous decades.

Furthermore, with even more freedom given to Kazakh Communist Party with perestroika, *The*

Green bazaar in the capital city Almaty.

census from 1970, 1979 and 1989, 41.8%, 52.3% and 60.4% respectively of the ethnic Kazakhs claimed to have a command of Russian. In 1989, despite showing loyalty to their native language (97%), 60.4% considered themselves bilingual. This data of 97% of Kazakhs speaking their native language is disputable since S.Z. Zimanov estimated that as much as about 40% of Kazakhs did not speak their native tongue or spoke it very poorly (cf. Fierman 2005:405). Russians predominantly occupied the urban areas of the country, relegating Kazakh to the rural social sphere. Kazakh became a language of minimal importance, as it was not intrinsic to upward mobility or navigating urbanized society. Similarly, Kazakhs from rural areas encountered many difficulties when moving to the cities and urban Kazakhs, who had a strong command of Russian looked down on newly arrived rural Kazakhs, who could barely speak Russian.

The first shift of attention to Kazakh language by the Soviets was triggered by the emergence of national consciousness among the ethnic Kazakhs

Language Law (1989) was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan declaring Kazakh as the state language and Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication (Dave 2007:101). It was a first time Kazakh language was elevated to a level higher than that of Russian despite the fact that Kazakhstan was the most likely state in Central Asia to adopt Russian as the state language. Barely one in one hundred Russians in 1989 spoke Kazakh and the census data of 98.5% of Kazakhs having a good command of the language was grossly exaggerated (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001:56). Unlike in other republics where similar laws passed served to fortify the titular languages that already enjoyed a popular support, in Kazakhstan they simply carried a symbolic meaning as Kazakh did not enjoy the same prestigious status as did the titular languages in the Baltic republics, for example.

Even though the Kazakh language was elevated and the republics were granted more freedom over the

language policy, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a resolution on the *The Nationality Policy of the Party in the Current Circumstance* (1989). This resolution declared all languages in the Union equal and prohibited language discrimination. The Soviet language politics carried a double faced character reflecting the communal apartment approach to identity and language issue in the Union. On the one hand, the authorities used a non-titular (except for the ethnic Russians themselves) Russian language to forge a soviet identity and on the other hand, by drawing a strong connection between language and nationality, Moscow used titular language of each republic during 'korenizatsiya' and less so later on to forge titular identities of their own. The same strategy was to be employed by the government in Astana but this time utilizing Kazakh language, which is to be demonstrated in more detail below.

LANGUAGE POLITICS AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE AND ITS CONTINUITY

Although the Kazakh authorities gained more leverage closer to independence, they admitted the complexity of the language issue and abated their approach. They had to take into account the Russian minority and its prevalent presence in the North and poor knowledge of Kazakh language among ethnic Kazakhs. A rural versus urban dichotomy posed another obstacle for the authorities. While most of the urban Kazakhs spoke solely Russian, rural Kazakhs spoke Kazakh and were fluent in Russian as well. Kazakh had completely lost its importance for the urban Kazakh population, whereas Russian was necessary to secure future career opportunities. This language divide served as an obstacle to consolidation between the urban and rural Kazakhs. Therefore, the objective of the language policies consisted of consolidating the Kazakhs together without disagreeably affecting the Russian population so as to prevent their future outmigration. Consequently, the government tried to find a medium to satisfy both sides. Thus, a growing prevalence of the Kazakh language was not the main objective of the government shortly after independence; it was primarily to unite the ethnic Kazakhs using the language and its unifying and authenticating function, as stated by Fishman.

Thus in the *Declaration of Independence (O Gosudastvennoi Nezavisimosti*, 1991)*,* the language issue did not receive much attention because it only stressed the importance of general cultural attributes, such as a "development of culture, traditions and language, and consolidation of the Kazakh national virtue (merit) and virtue of other nationalities, living in Kazakhstan." With the growing necessity for the first Constitution, the newly independent state issued the *Constitution of Sovereign Kazakhstan* (1993) where Kazakh was defined as the state language and

Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication, reflecting the 1989 Language Law. However, this division of roles between languages triggered debates among political activists and nationalists especially, who argued that by designating Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication would result in Kazakh remaining a language of lesser importance, and would discourage Russian speakers from learning Kazakh. One of the main arguments they used was that Kazakh could not compete with Russian, thus it required more legal support than Russian did. Later, a new constitution was adopted which stripped the Russian language of its role as language of inter-ethnic communication. *The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Konstitutsiya Respubliki Kazakhstan 1995)* reiterated Kazakh as the state language: "the Russian language shall be officially used on equal grounds with the Kazakh language in state institutions and local-self administrative bodies. A year later, the government issued the resolution *Concept of Language Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan* analyzing the language situation, concluded that the Kazakh language continued to be of diminished stature compared to Russian and laid out a language program for further expansion of functions of the former. In 1997 a *Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages* was passed reflecting the Constitution that Kazakh was the state language and Russian was to be used on equal grounds with Kazakh. It also added that "it is a duty of every citizen of Kazakhstan to master the state language, which is the main factor of consolidation of the people of Kazakhstan" *(Zakon* o *Yazykah ot Iyulya* 1997 N# 151). Although this law stressed that the state language should be employed by the governmental and non-governmental business institutions and that its functions should be expanded, it also declared discrimination on the basis of language unlawful, gave freedom to citizens to speak their native language and promised to develop all of the languages of the people of Kazakhstan, an approach that strongly resembled the Soviet method of promoting Russian language and culture without appearing to completely disregard other languages.

Together with these policies, several other actions were taken to elevate the status of the state language. For instance, the percentage of books published in Kazakh substantially increased from 19% in 1990 to 45% in 1993 and the number of the books published in Russian declined (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001:91). The *Law on Education* (1992) also promoted Kazakh language schools and emphasized the importance of studying it. This bore some results as in 1989-90 academic year only 17.9 % of students went to higher-education institutions with Kazakh language instruction but in the period between 2002 to 2005 this number ranged between 32% and 40% (Fierman 2005:407). To strengthen the feeling of an independent state with its own historical memories and myths, the government also undertook the program

of renaming physical geographical, toponymic, industrial and other objects with Kazakh names. For instance, a street named Lenin Street in Kostanay was renamed to Al-Farabi Street after the Muslim philosopher and thinker.

Despite of all these changes in the legal status of the Kazakh language the results appear to be rather superficial. One of the main objectives of the 1997 Law on Languages was the expansion of the functions of the state language. However, the functions of Kazakh only appeared to be expanding on the surface. For instance, even though more office work was carried out in Kazakh it was so only because of a high number of document translations from Russian into Kazakh. So, effectively, office work is still carried out in Russian and then translated into Kazakh. Radio stations and television channels also circumvent the law on media that requires the proportion of programs in Kazakh to be no smaller than of those in Russian and other languages by broadcasting the programs in Kazakh during off–peak hours.

Often, officials and official documents tend to over-rate and exaggerate the facts in order to create a false sense of policy success. For instance, the government used census manipulation to exaggerate the numbers of Kazakhs speaking Kazakh. However, I found that this does not apply to the new *Conception of Expanding the Functions of the State Language* (2007) for it acknowledged the gap between policy and its implementation. It revealed that the documentation in central governmental bodies was still prepared in Russian, with only 20-30% of it being written in Kazakh. Even in the regions with predominantly Kazakh population, the office work was still handled in Russian due to a lack of translators. According to this document, only 458 of 2300 newspapers and magazines published in the country are in Kazakh. It also admitted the nighttime broadcasting of Kazakh programs and "poor quality of many [Kazakh] programs, the lack of relevance and attractiveness of programs that can foster a culture of language and speech, ultimately, its successful mastery" *(Konceptsiya Rasshireniya Sphery Primeneniya Gossudarstvennogo Yazyka,* 2007). From this it is possible to conclude that there is a growing concern in the government over the implementation of the policy and its results. The authorities are willing to go beyond simply assigning Kazakh a symbolic role by legally and officially elevating its legal status. By publishing a negative account of failure and policy disregard, the authorities appear ready to take serious measures to realistically promote the Kazakh language and its communicative function in the social sphere.

The Conception also proclaims that due to a low quality of Kazakh language instruction, there is a lack of professionals educated in the Kazakh language, indicating the significance of its use in educational instruction. In spite of growth in the number of published textbooks, methods and literature in Kazakh, Conception argues that the organs of local administrative bodies do not supply local educational institutions with them. The document therefore admits the poor quality of language teaching methods, an admission often denied by 'nationalists' who blame the people's unwillingness to learn the language instead of the poor quality of teaching methods (Ramazanova 2011:44).

The failure of policy being implemented is also supported by the evidence gathered from the government officials. It is evident that although there was an official requirement to have an excellent command of the Kazakh language for government workers, most of the employees in city administration in the Northern region of the country did not speak Kazakh and were not required to learn it in the near future, despite the law that requires all government documents to be written in Kazakh. In general, this issue was of low importance to the authorities, who emphasize that professional competence is of higher priority than knowledge of the state language. It is also apparent that there is a lack of qualified professionals who also speak Kazakh fluently (Ramazanova 2011:44). All documentation is still handled in both languages by translators, who are responsible for translating the documents into Kazakh. The rule to hire candidates with knowledge of Kazakh is not abided and registering for Kazakh courses, which are completely subsidized, is not mandatory and is completely at will.

Additionally, the mayor *(akim)* of the Kostanai region does not speak Kazakh well but can use it on the conversational level (Ramazanova 2011:45). Nevertheless, during various conversations with the local citizens on this subject, most of the locals believed that he spoke Kazakh since they saw him speak it on the local news channel. It appears that the mayor chooses to project an image of speaking Kazakh while he does not speak proficiently. The mayor's appointment by a president who also speaks the state language poorly indicates that the central government is not highly concerned by the extent to which language policies are implemented. The mayor, like any other high official figure, is expected to be a role model for the country, setting an example by speaking or at least making an effort to learning Kazakh. Therefore, despite the passage of myriad rules and regulations on language, the enforcement of the policies appears to be negligent. Although the government is attempting to develop the communicative function of the language, its symbolic function is more prevalent in regions with a high percentage of Kazakh Russophones (those natives Kazakhs whose first language is Russian) and Russians.

Furthermore, the enforcement of the rules depends on who is in power at the time. Many of those working for the government in the northern city of Kostanay explain that the relaxation of the rules

concerning the state language was partially due to the mayor being ethnic Russian. The rules are not strict but if someone from the South, historically a more nationalistic part of the country, comes to power then the rules might be more tightly enforced (Ramazanova 2011:45). Low knowledge of the state language is also blamed on the inefficient teaching methodology of Kazakh language at schools. Unlike the English language, Kazakh does not have well-developed teaching methodology dating back to the Soviet period, perhaps due to the omission of Kazakh language instruction from school curricula under the Soviets.

By contrast, the opinions of officials representing various state language institutions can be placed on the opposite side of the scale. The budget allocated by the central government to this institution has increased from 3 million tenge (appx. 15,000 euro) in 2003 to 45 million tenge (appx. 215,000 euro) per year, suggesting a growing importance of the language issue to the state authorities. In addition, the percentage of the population that can speak and write in Kazakh has reached 77%. By year 2020 a language plan included an increase of that number to 95%, which will be achieved through improving teaching methods at schools and offering free language courses to the general population. A special emphasis was placed on the improvement of Kazakh language instruction stressing an increase of the hours Kazakh language is taught per week (Ramazanova 2011:45). The number of hours of Kazakh language instruction has increased from three to five hours per week this year as part of the government program from the president's state-of-the-nation address, where a goal of having 80% of population speaking Kazakh fluently by 2020 was set.

The main priority of the Kazakhstani elite was the adoption of a law that would grant a symbolic supremacy to Kazakh language without undermining their own position or damaging societal equilibrium (Dave 2007:116). Often when talking to high officials or elderly Kazakhs (older people are traditionally highly respected by the younger) Kazakh people, even without knowing the language well, would still start off their conversation in Kazakh and then switch to Russian. In business relations, Kazakh language is not necessary to know but is crucial for building personal bonds and in informal negotiations. A need for Kazakh language proficiency is correlated with professional field and region. For instance, in northern regions of Kazakhstan with close proximity to Russia and with a significant Russian population, knowledge of Kazakh is not a determinant factor for an individual's career even if he/she is a government worker. Contrastingly, in southern regions with predominantly ethnic Kazakh populations, knowing Kazakh is key for government positions as well as for socializing. Interestingly, Kazakh still appears to yield to Russian language in business related fields. Therefore, even though the

evidence reveals an increased effort of the government to expand the communicative function of Kazakh language, its symbolic function still prevails.

LANGUAGE CONFLICT

Due to the heavy influence of Soviet centralized government and the current president being a member of the communist apparatus in the USSR, politics in Kazakhstan can still be characterized as undemocratic and thus not representing the interests of all layers of society.

In addition, the fact that the president appoints regional governors himself and has altered Constitution in order to prolong his own term in the office tells that the system is not democratic enough. To be able to analyze which interests are being represented by the government on the topic of language, it is crucial to understand the arguments of the two parties involved in the language conflict among the intelligentsia of the Kazakh society.

There is a language divide between Kazakh-speakers and non-Kazakh speakers, both of them being fluent in Russian. Second, within the latter group there are ethnic Russians and ethnic Kazakhs- i.e. Kazakh Russophones. Whereas the preferences of ethnic Kazakh speakers and of ethnic Russians are straightforward, the preferences and opinions of the Kazakh Russophones are not as transparent. With their Kazakh ethnicity and Russian language, they are caught up between the two groups. Kazakh Russophones occupy a difficult space: if they bow to Kazakh speakers' language preference they would have to disavow their first language and learn Kazakh; if they do not, they are often disparaged as 'mankurts', a term used to describe someone who lost his ethnic identity and native language, and has become synonymous with being Russified (Dave 2007:50). However, as they comprise 60% of the total population, their interests are represented by one of the sides in the debate (Peyrouse 2007:486).

In general, there are two sides of the debate between ethnic Kazakhs with a perfect command of Kazakh language, who tend to be called and call themselves 'nationalists' and Russian speaking population. The Russian speaking population divides into ethnic Russians, who promote official bilingualism, and ethnic Kazakh Russophones. It is often the case that the opinions of Kazakh Russophones are left unheard since the language conflict revolves primarily around Russians, who promote official bilingualism and ethnic Kazakh nationalists, who support full transformation into Kazakh. Kazakh Russophones, being left in the middle, should be considered as a separate group within the population since it also fits the typology formulated by two Kazakhstani academicians, who divided Kazakh society into three groups with regard to their viewpoint on the construction of 'ethnocratic' state. The first and the most numerous group consists of rural members

of the educated classes, who were born in Kazakh traditional-patriarchical towns. Having been educated in Kazakh language and schools, they perceive Russian culture as alien. Though they are fully integrated into urban life, they retain their traditional world view, "which sets them in natural opposition to a linguistically and otherwise urban culture" (Smith *et al* 1998: 140). The second and least numerous group are urban Kazakh people, who are linguistically Russian and are also estranged from Kazakh culture. The members of the third group are equally integrated into Kazakh and Russian cultures "and are therefore characterized by an 'ethnocultural and linguistic dualism'" (Smith *et al* 1998: 140). This typology highlights the divide within the society and marks out Russophone Kazakhs as a separate group, whose position in the current language divide is not as clear as the one of the other two groups.

The language laws granting a significant status to the Russian language are strongly opposed by the nationalists and the anti-Russian language laws are not favored by Kazakh Russophones. Despite the usage of the term 'debate' the two sides

A Kazakh nomadic boy with a traditional hunting eagle.

do not communicate with each other in public and often are not even aware of each other's stance. Nationalists take their debate to the media and get published in the Kazakh Press (Ramazanova 2011:48). Kazakh nationalists usually vent their rancor in Kazakh-language newspapers that hardly any Russophones are able or care to read (Kolsto 1998:53). Most Russian-language media is non-political and it is so "because they are afraid to touch on this subject" (Ramazanova 2011:48). That Kazakh speakers are not 'afraid' to air their complaints in the open, but the Russian speakers are, may indicate a sense of entitlement and leverage felt by the Kazakh speaking activists. This may be so because they sense support from the Constitution and policy, whereas the Russian-speaking activists might feel they have no legal grounds to substantiate their case.

The less prestigious status of Kazakh is also often linked to post-colonialism by the nationalists. The reason ethnic Kazakhs are not willing to learn their native tongue, they feel, is explained by the post-colonial attitude that Kazakhstan was a second or third-rate country which did not justify the knowledge of its own language by all citizens. Nationalists argue that this post-colonial attitude will pass, claiming that all Kazakhs should know their language and that the country should become mono-linguistic state.

The nationalist side also insists that the majority of young Kazakhs are nationalistic and would push for more nationalistic policies causing the authorities to succumb (Ramazanova 2011: 48). They hold that while previously the government could give different accounts in Russian and Kazakh language, it cannot now do that without damaging its reputation. Nationalists were also able to convince the president to insert the formula into the Constitution that "it is a duty of every citizen to learn and know Kazakh language" (Konstitutsia Respubliki Kazakhstan 1995). The nationalists believe that the majority of the country is supportive of the language revival and it is their interests that are being represented in the policy (Ramazanova 2011: 48).

This is also in line with the results (Graham Smith *et al* 1998: 140) that primarily the members of rural Kazakh intelligentsia, educated in Kazakh schools and brought up in traditional Kazakh town and villages, guide the nationalizing policies. Though being fully integrated into urban life, they nonetheless retained their traditional worldviews. This implies that those members of intelligentsia employing nationalist and primordial arguments have gained the upper hand in promoting nationalizing policies.

Many of them also consider Russian language as an "outgoing reality" due to the growing Russian outmigration claiming that in some decades it would completely yield to Kazakh language.

However, on the side of the spectrum, offering an instrumentalist explanation, are those who believe that the elites in Kazakhstan are predominantly Russophone and as long as they are in power, the Russian language will dominate. The urban population in Kazakhstan has a higher social status and is economically a more powerful group creating stark class stratification with a rich Russophone class (comprised of ethnic Russians and ethnic Kazakhs) and poor Kazakh-speaking class. For Russophone elites, economic self-interest and a desire for social mobility prevail over ethnic loyalty.

Often when interacting with government officials on the issue of language they intentionally choose to give an interview in Kazakh though they speak perfect Russian. Kazakh becomes a political instrument and is intentionally promoted due to its weak communicative function compared to that of Russian. The legal elevation of the Kazakh language is seen as mere political maneuvering.

Stressing the shortcomings of language planning and in particular a poor Kazakh terminology development, Kazakh language cannot become the language of communication due to the dominance of Russian language in all spheres of the social structure. The social structure where an individual grows up, socializes and becomes a part of society is filled with Russian language. Even those Russian-speaking parents, who take their children to schools with Kazakh as a language of instruction, still do not succeed at having their children speak fluent Kazakh. In such cases, Kazakh remains as a 'school language' and their Kazakh vocabulary is limited to the one used at school. Reflecting the data that the government does not enforce the requirement of government employees' having a good command of Kazakh, evidence suggests that all government institutions still operate in Russian and therefore it is enough to know Russian when communicating with the authorities.

It appears that the policy making process is heavily influenced by the nationalists. Their primordialist-like arguments that all self-respecting Kazakhs must know their 'mother tongue' have been gaining popularity among citizens. However, it is evident that despite the fact that the government has been promoting the Kazakh language in terms of policy making and implementation, the latter process is still lagging behind. The nationalists often overlook these flaws and deny the lack of conditions provided by the state to learn the language. They also insist on introducing a language test for everyone with certain levels of Kazakh being required for certain types of job, at the same time stressing that for government jobs knowledge of Kazakh should be mandatory.

The idea of having a regulation in a form of a state language test, the "KazTestfor" government job positions was already considered but never passed so as not to incur the displeasure of Russian-speaking Kazakhs in the government (Dave 2007:107). The test, might be adopted in 2020 but this information was not confirmed by official sources. Together with the increased budget allocation toward language planning this indicates a doubled effort of the government plan to revive the 'native tongue' of the Kazakhs (Ramazanova 2011:50). However, it is also evident that policy implementation still has not achieved the point of Kazakh language being spoken more than Russian, i.e. compared to Russian language its communicative

A Kazakh dombra player.

function still remains underutilized. While economic growth is conducive to the language revival and increases the chances of Kazakh language gaining upper hand, it still does not have sufficient impact due to a large role played by the way the budget is utilized, i.e. how well is the policy implemented.

It is hard to predict whether the nationalists will succeed in exerting their pressure to make the regulations stricter. Although the nationalist argue that the government sides with the majority, it is applicable in democratic states, which Kazakhstan is not. Freedom House rated Kazakhstan as 'not free', with Civil Liberties score being 5 and Political Rights 6 (1 being the highest and 7 the lowest) (Freedom House). In this light, it may be more accurate to predict that even though policy execution has improved, Russian language will dominate as long as the Kazakh elite is Russian speaking.

CONCLUSION

Tradition does not hinder modernization and nationalism is a complement to the modernizing processes that are aimed at creating a unified nation. The Kazakh government has embarked upon a journey of nation-building and instilling national identity among its multi-ethnic society while developing its economy after the collapse of Soviet Union. From a poor country in the early 1990's Kazakhstan has emerged as a leader in economic development in the region. The country introduced the free market system and privatization while extensively emphasizing symbols of nationhood such as the native language, tradition and culture. This proves that tradition and nationalism does not hinder the process of sustainable economic growth, and indeed contributes towards aspirations of a more unified nation. However, despite the extensive language policies promoting Kazakh language amongst its titular group, Kazakh, unlike Russian, still does not fulfill its communicative function. This is due firstly to a lack of national identity prior to independence and secondly to the shortcomings of the policy implementation caused by the still large majority of the Russian-speaking elites. Importantly, the improved situation of the Kazakh language planning shown demonstrates that the interests of the nationalists are reflected in the policy making process.

Considering a decreasing share of Russian population due to outmigration and the continuation of

the Kazakh language revival, it seems likely that Kazakh language will prosper in decades to come. Although currently it cannot compete with Russian, provided the government continues its nationalizing politics, the Kazakh language has strong prospects for positioning as the main language of communication in Kazakhstan. ◘

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MOSTAFA KAMAL TOLBA

CONVERSATION-BASED DEVELOPMENT

A) Conversation aims to achieve three main objectives:

1 ~ To maintain essential ecological process and life-support systems;

2 ~ To preserve genetic diversity, on which depends the functioning of the above processes and systems, the protection of cultivated plants, domesticated animals and microorganisms, and the security of many industries that use living resources.

3 ~ To ensure the sustainable utilization of fish and other wildlife, forests and grazing lands, which support millions of rural communities and major industries.

B) Main obstacles to achieving conversation are:

1 ~ The belief that living resource conversation is a sector, rather than a process that must be considered by all sectors; and the consequent failure to integrate conversation with development;

2 ~ Inflexible and needlessly destructive development process, due to undue emphasis on narrow short term interest rather than longer term ones;

3 ~ Inadequate legislation and lack of enforcement; poor organization; lack of trained personnel; and lack of basic information on the productive and regenerative capacities of living resources.

4 ~ Lack of awareness of the benefits of conversation.

The paper ends with a number of specific recommendations for the achievements of conversation-based development.

TEODORA HASEGAN

DEVELOPMENT, IDENTY AND HERITAGE:
THE CASE OF THE SIBIU ECOMUSEUM

In response to the membership in the European Union, post-communist states, societies and economies in Eastern Europe are undergoing unprecedented change and are in a process of re-definition. The European integration process relies in part on programmes initiated by the European Commission, one of which is the European Capital of Culture (ECC). In 2007, Sibiu city in Romania, together with Luxembourg and the Greater Region, was named ECC. The status of ECC was simultaneous with Romania's accession to the EU. Thus, the events taking place in Sibiu were given great symbolic and political importance in the country.

The article looks at how, in the context of Sibiu ECC 2007 programme, heritage is an essential part of different strategies used by local people in Sibiu city and region to promote economic, social, and cultural development and to strengthen and increase the global competitiveness of regions, in this case, Transylvania. There is a renewed concern for revitalizing local traditions, which are seen as necessary in affirming Romanian national identity in the context of European Union. At the same time, traditions strengthen regional identities.

The article examines the inauguration of the first ecomuseum in Romania, Sibiu County Ecomuseum (Eco-

muzeul Regional Sibiu), an example of how heritage, landscape and identity were linked and gained more importance in the context of the Sibiu ECC 2007 programme that aimed at asserting the potential of heritage for economic development.

DIANA RAMAZANOVA

THE SOVIET LEGACY AND THE FUTURE
OF LANGUAGE POLITICS
IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

After becoming its own nation-state in 1991 for the first time in history, Kazakhstan has been facing major challenges on its path to nation-building. Amidst economic difficulties caused by the shift from communist command economy to a free market system, the country had to unite its multiethnic society with no prior memory of nationhood into a coherent nation. As a result of the extensive Soviet language and identity politics, it was the only republic in the USSR to have the biggest share of its titular Kazakh population speaking Russian to the extent of not knowing their own- Kazakh language. Nonetheless, the country chose nationalism in a form of language revival as means of building a nation whilst developing its economy.

The article traces the process of development and its relation to language revival and nationalism in Kazakhstan pointing out the shortcomings of language policy implementation and the future prospects for Kazakh language. ▣

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
*It is not certain that
everything is uncertain.*

PASCAL, *Pensée,* 1670.

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